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Abstract:
Microfinance is widely portrayed as a tool that empowers poor women to 
challenge constraining social institutions and make better, rational 
choices that will enable them to escape poverty. At the same time, the 
reported impact of microfinance is underwhelming, and scandals and 
poor practices widely documented. This then poses a puzzle: why do 
people still borrow from microfinance institutions? In response to this 
question, this article ethnographically examines the moral economy of 
microfinance in rural Bangladesh, examining how morality shapes the 
remit of legitimate economic activity and social change locally. For men, 
fieldworkers use stories of moral ‘idols’ to embed narratives of 
microfinance within existing rural social institutions to legitimise and 
normalize microfinance. For women, borrowing is presented as a means 
to perform ‘dharma’, a moral imperative to protect, retain or compete for 
male guardianship. The moral economy of microfinance is one that 
motivates people living in poverty to imitate and conform to prevalent 
gendered and hierarchical norms and values. These arguments highlight 
the significance of conformity to social and moral obligations in economic 
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Abstract
Microfinance is widely portrayed as a tool that empowers poor women to challenge constraining 
social institutions and make better, rational choices that will enable them to escape poverty. At the 
same time, the reported impact of microfinance is underwhelming, and scandals and poor practices 
widely documented. This then poses a puzzle: why do people still borrow from microfinance 
institutions? In response to this question, this article ethnographically examines the moral economy of 
microfinance in rural Bangladesh, examining how morality shapes the remit of legitimate economic 
activity and social change locally. For men, fieldworkers use stories of moral ‘idols’ to embed 
narratives of microfinance within existing rural social institutions to legitimise and normalize 
microfinance. For women, borrowing is presented as a means to perform ‘dharma’, a moral 
imperative to protect, retain or compete for male guardianship. The moral economy of microfinance 
is one that motivates people living in poverty to imitate and conform to prevalent gendered and 
hierarchical norms and values. These arguments highlight the significance of conformity to social and 
moral obligations in economic behaviour, and bear important implications for understanding the 
remits of social change.
Key words: microfinance; moral economy; agency; social institutions; Bangladesh; ethnography; 
social change.
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INTRODUCTION
Monowara (43) and Joynuddin (55) are locally known as idols1 in a rural para (neighbourhood) of 
Tangail district, Bangladesh2. When they and I first met, in the winter of 2011, the idols recounted the 
story of how they managed to diversify their income sources and manage successful small-scale 
businesses. Sitting in his bari (village home) Joynuddin explained that nine years after he married 
Monowara in 1972, microfinance credit officers ‘came to our house to inform us about loans’. ‘They 
explained their usefulness’ he said, and that ‘if my young wife takes it, it would help us improve our 
life […] and if we managed to return the first loan of BDT10,0003 they would give us a BDT20,000 
loan next time’. Joynuddin remembers following the credit officers’ advice not to spend the loan but 
to invest it in the mobile paan (betel nut) shop he had been running. In 1983, he borrowed BDT5,000 
and repaid it weekly, then he borrowed a further BDT10,000 in 1985, and BDT20,000 in 1987. The 
latter two loans were invested in a small grocery shop he had opened with his son. The business was 
very successful and in 2007, Joynuddin stopped taking microfinance and sold his shop. The profit 
from the sale financed his son’s migration to Malaysia. 
Bangladesh is the second largest microfinance market in the world, with some 25.6 million 
Bangladeshi borrowers (registered in 2017), and part of a global market estimated to reach 139 
million low-income households, with loans worth USD114 billion globally (Convergences, 2018). 
Stories like that of Joynuddin and Monowara helped fuel the expansion of the sector in Bangladesh, 
and similar cases have become part of a widely accepted discourse about the poverty-alleviating 
impact of microfinance. The representations of heroic entrepreneurs such as Monowara and 
Joynuddin began to encroach on development discourse and practice in the late 1980s. Initially 
microfinance was promoted as a technical solution and tool to support the poor negotiate adverse and 
imperfect markets (De Haan and Zoomers, 2005) and viewed as countering structuralist analyses of 
poverty. These stories portray microfinance’s success as unbridling the entrepreneurial poor, 
generating a welcome ‘revolution’ in the mission to eradicate poverty. Although primarily concerned 
with financial transactions, microfinance acquired an orthodoxic and symbolic status as a primary 
catalyst of development; termed by some as ‘microfinance evangelism’ (Rogaly, 1996; Roy, 2010: 
93).
As microfinance expanded over time, so did a growing body of research that raised concerns about 
the sector’s rapid commericalisation, suggesting the mission and practice of microfinance had 
‘drifted’. This highlighted evidence of malpractices, and examined the wider negative social effects 
1 The English term being used in Bengali.
2 There are 64 Districts (administrative seats) in Bangladesh. Tangail is located in the central region of 
Bangladesh.
3 About USD$122. In winter 2011, 100 BDT was approximately worth USD$1.22.
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and sometimes polarising economic impacts of loans and debt for the very poor (Banerjee and 
Jackson, 2017; Bateman, 2012; Dichter and Harper, 2007; Hulme and Maîtrot, 2014; Mader, 2015; 
Maîtrot, 2019; Taylor, 2011). This then poses a puzzle: why, if these analyses are valid, do poor 
people still choose to borrow from microfinance institutions (MFIs, henceforth)? Common 
explanations of this in the literature point to the poor’s limited access to alternative reliable sources of 
finance, the adverse inclusion or coercion of women borrowers by male family members (husbands, 
fathers, sons or father-in-law), and to rising debt levels and borrowing traps. Resonant with wider 
recent analyses of microfinance (Goodman 2017; Guérin and Kumar 2017; Kar 2018), this article 
suggests a different answer to this question: microfinance’s expansion was only possible because it 
was embedded within cultural norms, rendering it a socially acceptable and indeed a moral 
imperative. 
Drawing from a year long ethnography in rural Bangladesh, this article explores the ‘moral economy’ 
of microfinance by examining how gendered rationalities shape the meanings and values of economic 
choices and behaviours (Goodman 2017; Palomera and Vetta 2016; Simoni, 2016). More specifically, 
I argue that microfinance’s expansion relied on an ecology of norms, values and practices, that 
encouraged clients to conform to existing class and gender inequalities. As hinted at in the opening 
vignette, although microfinance targets women, it is common for men to control loans and use them 
as they see fit. The role of MFI fieldworkers is crucial in this process as they construct narratives 
around idols that present microfinance as a moral imperative for poor clients: a means to pursue both 
moral aspirations and economic security. In this way microfinance participation becomes, de facto, a 
new norm to be adhered to, a moral compass for the gendered navigation of relational obligations. For 
women, borrowing then becomes a means to sustain, redeem or compete for male guardianship. For 
men, the option to borrow becomes a means to demonstrate their leadership and guardianship of their 
households. Crucially therefore morality or its performance is a medium of exchange that legitimizes 
the pursuit of change inherent in microfinance participation, thereby rethinking the place of individual 
agency in relation to social change in development (Arce and Long, 1999; Scott, 1976).
The article is structured as follows: the first section outlines how microfinance has been 
conceptualised as empowering women, enabling ‘rational’ choices and poverty reduction. It then 
surveys critical readings of such discouse, highlighting the concept of moral economies as a way of 
examining how morality shapes the remit of legitimate economic activity and social change. In the 
second section, I embed the analysis within the context of Bangladesh, examining the concept of 
dharma and the gendered social institutions women in Bangladesh navigate. The third section 
explains the methodology and background to this study. This is followed by two sections that develop 
key empirical arguments around the significance of conformity to social and moral obligations in the 
pursuit of security and change. Finally, the conclusion brings together different lines of argument to 
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highlight how current development ideals around individual agency and empowerment often occur 
incrementally and if embedded within local moral frameworks.  
AGENCY AND GENDER: MORAL ECONOMIES IN DEVELOPMENT 
Central to the expansion of the microfinance sector globally has been a set of claims about the 
potential of entrepreneurs to use their agency to pursue economic and social change. This imaginary 
has in particular promoted the idea of women as powerful agents of change. In the 1980s, 
microfinance was perceived as representing an opportunity to improve the legitimacy and visibility of 
women’s social struggles as well as gender inequalities in development (Fraser, 2009; Isserles, 2003). 
Women and girls came to prominence in the global development agenda as under-tapped resources 
for change (Shain, 2013) and their individual agency was considered a strategic locus in development 
(Cornwall, 2007; Kabeer, 2011). At a moment when feminism was often associated with radical 
socialist ideas, the practice of microfinance (focusing on group-lending and women empowerment) 
projected the image of entrepreneurial rural women, particularly mothers (Hossain, 2017: 90) leading 
the social transformation by emancipating themselves from and rupturing existing dysfunctional and 
oppressive institutions. 
The expansion of microfinance coalesced historically with what Rankin (2001) calls an ideology of 
the rational economic woman. Rational choice theory is underpinned by long-standing ideas about 
how the maximisation of utility functions drives individual decisions and behaviour. Focusing on 
answering the ‘how’ rather than ‘why’ people make certain choices, this approach focuses on 
economic utility and, by implication, regards individual tastes and preferences as exogenous factors 
(Kabeer, 2010). This theory of choice takes the decisions of individuals as its sole unit of analysis, 
giving little or narrow consideration to the power dynamics that shape the decision-making of its 
members (Ibid). Microfinance then represents an incursion of a gendered rational choice theory into 
development thinking in that it aimed to enable women to make better choices for their household. 
Here, the targeting of women was justified by the fact that women were found to better repay loans 
than men, and therefore conform to notions of rational economic behaviour. Furthermore, loans 
allocated to women were also found to have better wellbeing outcomes for household members (Ibid). 
As such, microfinance ‘elevated’ the position of women, who ‘empowered’ with loans, represented a 
‘better developmental investment’ (Berkovitch and Kemp, 2011: 160).  
This utilitarian view of poor women entrepreneurs has however been widely critiqued on a number of 
fronts. Notably, it has been argued to depoliticize the nature of women’s relationships within the 
households and with the market (Elyachar et al., 2005: 29-31), and neglect the multi-dimensionality 
of women’s experience of poverty (Saith, 2007) by emphasizing residual and absolute deficits rather 
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than its relational characteristic. By contrast with rational choice theory, more anthropological 
understandings of agency put social context at the centre of decision-making, and considers how 
norms, beliefs, routines and customs operate to shape preferences, attitudes and behaviours (Kabeer, 
2010). This view considers that within any household, an individual member’s sense of self-worth, 
role and identity are always shaped by others. One implication of this perspective is that the economic 
behaviour of a household is not then simply seen as the aggregation of decisions made by its 
individual members, but reflective of negotiations across a household’s hierarchy. For example, the 
distribution of labour, free time and resources within the household will depend on a number of 
factors including the perceived contribution made by specific members to the household’s welfare, 
and its valuation. Crucially, this approach helps explain how (in)equalities within the household can 
be legitimized. Situating agency within social institutions therefore helps illuminate how the nature 
and quality of institutions (i.e. ‘the rules of the game’) entangle the political, economic and financial 
realms constitutive of the ‘social order’ (Mosse, 2010; Townsend et al., 1999) in ways that shape 
opportunities for social change in development (North et al., 2009: 251-71). 
Contrary to the narrative that microfinance helps the ‘deserving poor’ caught up in, or held back by 
the ‘social’ (Gray, 2010), a growing body of literature has examined the complex ways in which 
microfinance in practice has interplayed with social hierarchies. As Kabeer (2001: 80) argued two 
decades ago, any attempt at conceptualizing empowerment needs to be grounded ‘in an understanding 
of the relationships of dependence, interdependence and autonomy which characterize gender 
relations in different cultures, the structures of risks, incentives and opportunities which they 
generate’. Rather than empower women, it has been argued microfinance and wider poverty-
alleviation efforts can make women ‘subjects’ of development (Fernando, 2006; Kabeer, 2005). 
Microfinance’s effects on intrahousehold dynamics are often argued to exacerbate existing oppressive 
social institutions and further entrench the gender and class-based inequalities it is meant to tackle 
(Fernando, 1997, Karim, 2011, Bateman and Maclean, 2017). It can erode the webs of interlocking 
ties and reciprocal networks upon which women’s status and survival strategies often rely (Maclean, 
2010; Molyneux, 2002). As such, people’s disposition towards and experience of risk can be argued 
to be gendered (Maclean, 2013). Where microfinance debts intertwine with and capitalise on the 
invisibility of women’s reproductive work, and ‘social capital’, it can lead to ‘dispossession’ in rural 
communities (Paprocki, 2016).
One recent line of argument developed in the context of South Asia is that for microfinance to thrive, 
it must in fact serve or be adapted so that it can serve existing social institutions. In the context of 
India for example, Kar (2018: 109) argues that microfinance in Kolkata is ‘domesticated’ into 
women’s lives, ‘enfolded into women’s existing schedules of domestic labor, [thereby] limiting its 
impact on women’s empowerment’. Goodman (2017) similarly examines how for Kumaonis in 
Page 5 of 28 Development and Change
6
Uttarakhand state microfinance has been altered to fit existing ‘exchange relationships’ that govern 
the life of the family and community. It ‘became another node in the already existing networks of 
assistance’ (Ibid: 362), and gained popularity on this basis. For Guérin and Kumar (2017: 742) 
microfinance in rural South India is ‘both shaped by and constitutive of local structures of power’, 
meaning that microfinance strengthens patronage driven and patriarchal institutions.  
In examining how microfinance is adapted and legitimised locally, Kar (2018) and Goodman (2017) 
have drawn attention to the role of morality in this process, deploying the concept of ‘moral 
economy’.4 The concept of a moral economy refers to how shared ethical frameworks legitimise 
economic activity, enabling us to examine processes and remits of change. Whereas it has been 
argued by classical sociologists that development is a process that disembeds individuals from local 
rules, social institutions and contexts (Polanyi, 1944), a moral economy framework highlights the 
entanglement of economic activity and social institutions the rural poor have to navigate. By contrast 
with a ‘homo oeconomicus’ characterisation of agency, the notion of moral economy combats ‘crass 
economic reductionism’ that obliterates ‘the complexities of motive, behaviour, and function’, 
constructing ‘an abbreviated view of economic man’ (Thompson 1971: 78). In early and prominent 
usage within academia, the term was used to highlight how moments of social and political rupture 
occur with the expansion of capitalist relations, and conflict with other notions of moral exchange and 
activity (Thompson 1971, Scott 1976). It hence has served as a way of examining how socio-political 
disjuncture can be an indicator of the ‘conflicting co-presence’ of competing moral frameworks 
(Simoni, 2016: 462). 
Equally however the concept of moral economy can be used as a way of examining how ideas about 
moral behaviour intertwine with economic relationships in ways that maintain rather than rupture the 
social reproduction of hierarchy (Palomera and Vetta 2016). It can hence ‘highlight the ambiguous 
logics and values that guide and sustain livelihood practices, by looking at the dynamic fields of struggle 
around the boundaries of what is good and acceptable, their power hierarchies and the political projects 
they might inform’ (Palomera and Vetta 2016: 415).5 Here I hence adapt Thompson’s framework to 
accommodate for a more relational perspective that replaces the examination of one particular 
population group (i.e., the poor) to the study of the values, meanings and practices exchanged and 
emerging from the interplay between the poor and microfinance fieldworkers. The exploration of the 
4 These authors apply the concept of moral economy in different ways. For Kar (2017) it is applied as a means to 
explore the behaviour of credit officers, while Goodman (2017) uses it to refer to the relationships of obligation 
and exchange that govern networks of assistance. 
5 Early usages of the concept highlighted the moral economy ‘of’ particular groups (Thompson 1971, Scott 1976). 
One interpretation of this has been to say that moral economy as a concept is thus particular to pre-capitalist forms 
of hierarchy and obligation. By contrast, more recent usages of the concept have highlighted the plurality of moral 
economies, and their modes of operation in any given field as highlighted by Fassin (2009).
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particular ways in which the ‘social’ and ‘economic’ are entwined represents a framework for 
approaching questions of why social actors pursue or resist change, and how this is conceptualised.  
DHARMA, WOMEN AND CHANGE IN BANGLADESH
  
To begin to examine the moral economy of microfinance in rural Bangladesh, we need to examine the 
prevailing social institutions, which are characterised by pervasive inter-personal hierarchical 
networks of patronage (Devine, 2006; Lewis, 2011). The concept of dharma, referring to ‘the proper 
order of things’, is useful to understand the way inter-personal hierarchical relations and networks of 
patronage are legitimized in Bangladesh (Devine and White, 2013: 134). Etymologically, the word 
dharma is derived from the Sanskrit root dhr, meaning to sustain (Inden 1976: 19) which is 
suggestive of the attributes of ‘what makes the life of a community persist’ (Kotalova, 1996: 46). In 
practice, it comes close to Bourdieu’s notion of habitus in that it is embodied in people’s habits, 
rituals and lifestyle (Bourdieu, 1977). Conventionally translated as religion, dharma is a broader 
ontological and moral framework that encompasses a set of social norms and values that produce 
individual dispositions and define the socially-accepted contours of individual agency (Devine and 
White, 2013). As such, social institutions and the hierarchies and obligations they entail in this 
context can be seen as having an inherent moral meaning.
The nature of agency is deeply gendered in this context. A prominent way in which this is felt is 
through the idea of purdah, the practice of sexual segregation, which has a long history in Bengali 
Muslim, Hindu and Christian communities. It implies that women’s honour is preserved by limiting 
their movement and interactions outside the private sphere (Rozario, 2006). While honour (izzat) is 
often seen more as men’s responsibility, shame (lojja) or decency is often seen as women’s attribute 
(Rozario, 1992: 86). Purdah represents an ecology of norms that govern the respective roles of men 
and women in society in ways, often internalised, that influence women’s capacity to choose for 
themselves both symbolically and materially (White, 1992). Despite the forces of globalization and 
urbanisation, purdah largely remains a prevalent socio-cultural and ideological institution all Bengali 
women (extreme poor, poor, lower and middle-class women) navigate and negotiate (within 
themselves and with others) with varying degrees of agency (Kabeer, 2010). 
Within this order, it is important to examine how economic relationships and social networks are 
construed in moral terms and embedded in one other. Because women’s wellbeing, access and control 
over resources is often mediated by men (Kabeer, 2011), women play an important role in sustaining 
the reproduction of purdah as a modus operandi. For this reason, women’s participation in 
development initiatives has at times been contested and opposed by more traditional forces including 
Page 7 of 28 Development and Change
8
Islamic groups who perceived women’s involvement in development as a violation of the norms of 
purdah, thereby threatening the proper order of things (Naher, 2010). 
Although it is true that women play a central role in maintaining dharma, it is also true that the 
performance of dharma is a legitimate source of power for women (Blanchet, 2008). Visibly 
demonstrating adherence to the proper order of things is crucial for women. Women often work hard 
at preserving and developing good relationships with male patrons, protectors and guardians (father, 
brothers, husbands, and sons later on in life), whose moral duty is to provide them with material 
support and relative, if provisional, security (Kabeer, 2011). The mythico-ritualistic power of 
marriage is foundational to people’s sense of dharma and therefore constitutive of the reproduction of 
the moral order of things. For rural poor women therefore, marriage constitutes a pillar of the 
undisputed doxa, dharma, that carries symbolic and practical significance, as it places them within a 
new hierarchical system of obligations, which in theory guarantee their husband’s guardianship 
(Rozario, 1992; White, 2017). As the distribution of property is biased towards male household 
members through a dominant patrilineal structure (Karim, 2008), women are likely to become poor in 
the event of marital breakdown, illness or death of a male income earner (Maîtrot, 2017). In return for 
guardianship therefore, married women maintain a practice of purdah in ways that protect their izzat 
and uphold their moral status as well as that of their guardians’ (Kabeer, 2001; Rozario, 1998).6 
BACKGROUND, METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This study is based on a year long ethnography of the interactions between microfinance institutions’ 
agents and villagers across four villages in the district of Tangail conducted in 2010-2011. Located 
about four hours north of Dhaka in central Bangladesh, this area is now considered one of the most 
densely served districts in terms of MFI coverage and referred to as ‘the home of microfinance 
entrepreneurship’ (Chaudhury and Matin, 2002: 47). All families in the four villages of my study 
became acquainted with microfinance organizations in the 1980s.
A common joke among researchers and villagers goes that in this particular district of Bangladesh, 
households are so used to being surveyed by researchers, that they could fill in questionnaires 
themselves. From my experience of working in Bangladesh, I was aware that an NGO affiliation 
could exacerbate this problem and bias my interactions with local residents and MFIs employees. I 
therefore conducted the research as independently as possible, free from any local institutions, 
introducing myself as a researcher from a foreign university. With a research assistant7, I conducted 
6 Extreme poor women, who have ‘nothing’, and ‘no one’, are often seen to have more agency to negotiate their 
purdah, as their actions are driven by their strive for survival.
7 Although confident in spoken Bengali, I conducted this research with a male research assistant to facilitate 
entry into villages, and for security reasons. Working with a male research assistant required careful navigation, 
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mixed-methods research between 2010 and 2011. The primary research methods were participant 
observation and informal interviews with villagers and MFI staff. In addition to this, I conducted six 
focus group discussions with current clients, nine in depth formal interviews with former clients and 
key informant interviews with local leaders. 
When I began the research it was common for particularly curious locals to follow me through the 
towns, villages and on occasions into respondents’ houses. As the novelty of my presence wore off, 
people became less interested and aware of my whereabouts and I was able to interview people more 
automously and privately, one-to-one, in their homestead verandas, in their homes, in paddy fields, at 
tea stalls and village markets. As much as possible in this context, I maintained a high level of 
confidentiality, whilst being careful not to bother informants in the evening whilst they were tired and 
wanted to rest after a day of work. All respondents gave their informed consent to participate in the 
study. The information collected was triangulated by asking similar questions to a range of  key 
informants including police officers, village leaders, other family members, religious leaders, shop-
keepers and microfinance agents. Fieldwork was conducted in Bangla. The data was transcribed, 
translated into English, entered into NVivo and coded thematically. 
Using qualitative methods to explore the ‘seamless fabric’ of lived experiences (Latour, 1993: 7) in 
this way, is important in challenging proliferating interpretations and assumptions about social change 
in development (Arce and Long, 1999). Researching and interweaving multiple narratives of the lived 
experiences of microfinance clients – both past and current8 - was crucial to examine individual 
agency in the face of the change and authority microfinance agents embody (De Sardan, 2005). These 
narratives allowed me to examine the various meanings, including ambiguities, of individual agency. 
DEMONSTRATION, OBLIGATIONS AND IMITATION 
Contrary to the discourse that microfinance helps individuals overcome exclusive and imperfect 
institutions, this section shows how the moral economy of microfinance relies upon and reinforces 
existing social institutions. Through a process of demonstration, MFI staff construct moral ideals and 
figures of ‘development success’, locally known as idols, to legitimize microfinance interventions. 
Idols are idealised figures that represent the ‘good life’ most people desire and are used by MFI 
agents as examples for other clients to follow9. They are seen as embodying both virtue and material 
prosperity, where the latter can be cast as a fruit of the former. The erection of simple figures to be 
particularly in relation to women’s discussion of sensitive issues. In practice, I conducted many interviews 
partly or entirely alone to better facilitate such discussions.
8 Considering the small number of former clients in the studied population (28 out of 490), in-depth focus 
groups seemed an apposite tool to understand experiences and choices. 
9 It was unclear from the research whether this term stemmed from the villagers or microfinance agents however 
was widely used by both. 
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revered by their contemporaries for their economic and moral merit reveals a creative bricolage that 
intertwines powerful economic motivations, spiritual sentiments and religious norms surrounding 
duty and piety. Idols make ‘better choices’ and are able to fulfil their moral obligations to their 
families: for men this means successfully looking after their families, and for women it means 
performing and conforming to moral expectations. By linking microfinance and morality in this way, 
borrowing from MFIs is normalised and becomes a moral act in its own right. Not taking out loans or 
not engaging with MFIs is hence seen as a risky strategy, an immoral choice, and as the wrong thing 
to do. As a result, microfinance for the rural poor takes on moral meanings embedded within 
traditional social institutions.
Valuable idols
In all four villages, microfinance was first introduced by agents who were strangers to the local 
communities. In many ways, the idea of poor women taking loans from formal institutions, headed up 
by strangers, and often male strangers, belied the proper ‘order of things’ (Devine and White, 2013: 
134). Several Regional Managers and Branch Managers reported that the major challenge they faced 
was to preserve a good relationship with the general public. A Regional Manager who has worked for 
a MFI since 1974 reported that at the start, microfinance organizations put greater emphasis on the 
need to communicate and socialize with the public ‘because in the end’, he explains, ‘it is the 
responsibility of the loan officers to convince clients to participate’. Respondents described that when 
microfinance agents started recruiting clients in their village, people were wary of being visibly 
associated with something unknown and potentially controversial10. An elderly respondent and former 
microfinance client remembered back to when microfinance agents first came to his village: 
There is a proverb in Bangla: ‘if you put a candle close to a fire it will melt.’ It is the 
same between men and women. Credit officers come to our houses to collect loans, but 
you can never say who they really are inside. Over the course of a year, this man will 
develop a relationship with the family, be in regular contact with its women. You do not 
know what sort of glances he will give and to who and it is natural that a young man’s 
behaviour can slip. This creates an opportunity to do something wrong- ethically and 
religiously. So if we have the opportunity to avoid it, why don’t we? 
Microfinance agents are aware of the perception that microfinance loans may challenge power 
dynamics within households, making male household members particularly wary of microfinance and 
10 It can be noted that a further means by which microfinance was legitimised in this context was through the 
development of savings groups among clients. When explaining their motivation to borrow and livelihood 
strategies, respondents rarely made reference to the influence of group dynamics as such, and placed far greater 
emphasis on personal relations with specific fellow borrowers and with MFIs. 
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therefore less likely to participate. Male household members, conforming to their guardian role, act as 
gatekeepers and are generally distrustful towards unfamiliar men entering their homestead. Indeed, 
men sometimes express frustration at the fact that loans are given in women’s names, as a middle-
aged man Masud described:
The loans should be in the man’s name, because women stay under the men and they 
don’t even earn. They don’t even know how to earn. I don’t know what they think, but to 
me it should be in the man’s name then they will feel the pressure and will work hard. 
The women live in the house and feel afraid when the people of these institutions come 
to their house.
Such attitudes constituted a considerable challenge for microfinance agents11. Taking a loan with 
interest is often perceived or presented as conflicting with Sharia law and the Islamic banking system, 
which is predicated upon challenging the asymmetrical contractual relationship between borrowers 
and lenders. Risks borne by borrowers in microfinance loan configurations are generally considered 
disproportionate according to Islamic law. Such principles and moral value systems permeated 
religious boundaries, with other religious groups also reportedly feeling reluctant to participate. In this 
case, it meant that initially, the large majority of rural households were reluctant to borrow, casting 
microfinance borrowers as immoral. 
We know that global development projects develop local legitimacy through adaptation and 
‘translations’ to fit specific contexts (Ferguson, 1994; Mosse and Lewis, 2006; Radhakrishnan, 2015; 
Sharma, 2008). In this case, faced with the challenges explored above, microfinance agents over time 
deployed discursive tactics to normalise its practice by aligning it to traditional gender norms, thereby 
skilfully navigating the local social institutions. It is important then to recognise that the discretionary 
power of credit agents is often central to shaping the moral economy of microfinance in this context 
(and can be argued to create a ‘practice drift’ at the frontline of MFIs in Bangladesh (Maîtrot 2019)). 
This normalization was achieved as part of the wider commercialisation of the sector, in a variety of 
ways. The first encounter between a microfinance agent and a client typically occurs at the potential 
client’s homestead with credit officers addressing male household members and often deliberately 
excluding the future client (i.e., the woman) from initial exchanges. This is in part a tactic that shows 
respect to the head of the household, while allowing the agent to introduce him/herself. Speaking to 
the female members of a household without requesting the household head’s permission would be 
considered an insult to him12. 
11 Diffusion of innovation studies have long indicated the risk that early innovators might be treated as marginal 
as they can be perceived as highly deviant, as argued in Rogers (1962). 
12 Given the social institutions described above, it is unusual in rural Bangladesh that individuals who are not 
members of the household or the immediate community enter a home where females reside. 
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Microfinance agents make a rapid informal judgement about sources of potential tensions between 
their aim to formalise loans and a household’s view of the ‘proper order of things’. This judgement 
takes the level of vulnerability and poverty of a household into account judging by the size and 
condition of the homestead, the quality of clothes worn by the household members, and number of 
assets populating their homestead. Another element affecting the agents’ judgement is the religiosity 
of the household members. This requires recognizing contextual religious and cultural codes, ‘the 
material and ideological resources and practices of households and families’ (Standing, 1991:12). As 
well as reading into people’s verbal and body communication, agents can observe the degree to which 
purdah is enforced, religious clothing can be used as part of a wider set of symbols to signal piousness 
and religiosity (hijab or veil, tupi, Islamic beard and so on). From this information, agents infer the 
nature of kinship and interpersonal relationships and gender hierarchies characterising the household.
In order to reconcile microfinance with local institutions characterising a household, agents often 
portray microfinance borrowing as serving the existing social institutions and their associated norms 
and morals. A key means used by agents to recruit as well as retain microfinance clients is 
constructing and telling stories of idols. Idols embody development success and depict accounts of 
individuals (generally male) or households who have established prosperous businesses that enable 
them to provide for their families. In this context idols take on almost legendary status with tales of 
success being spread to nearby villages. Clients may not have met these idols, but they will have 
heard of them and of their success stories13. Nusrat Jahan, an elderly widow, described how 
microfinance agents ‘inspired’ poor households to take loans through song and stories about idols. 
She remembers Grameen Bank coming to her village in the 1980s, and singing ‘a song about how 
loans can change our lives. That persuaded us to join and I managed to make a group of five 
members’. During participant observation, as well as the nine focus groups, respondents told stories 
of households who became dhoni manush (wealthy people) by using loans. Nazma (35) a current-
client of four MFIs, explained: ‘We see a few successful people here and there, if you go to this place 
in Uttarnagar you will see lots of cows over there. This one guy started with BDT30,000 and now he 
has grown so big. He has a huge farm. He is rich. These stories convince us to take money [...].’
Accounts of idols generally focus on the successes of men. This rhetoric plays to the gendered image 
of the self-made entrepreneurial man (Gunnerud, 1997), calling on their family obligations to enthuse 
them to participate in microfinance. Men living in poverty often express the view that they are not 
13 This has parallels to the sociology on knowledge diffusion in successful agricultural extension programmes or 
family planning in rural Bangladesh. A common practice is to use entrepreneurs as knowledge diffusers about 
the new technology or practice (Mita and Simmons, 1995).
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able to meet their moral obligation to attend to the needs of their mother, father, wife and children. 
Narratives about idols portrayed as honourable and principled men able to fulfil their moral duties 
with regards to their dependents, make borrowing and lending from microfinance institutions an 
obvious or rational option. Microfinance participation therefore becomes the magic bullet for men 
anxious to fulfil their moral obligations towards their families. Refusal to participate is disapproved 
by credit officers, held as an immoral decision, a betrayal of moral responsibility. Most male 
respondents reported having been encouraged by credit officers to allow their wives to access loans so 
that they (husbands) could then use the money as they see fit.  In this way, their wives’ modesty 
(extra-familial interactions outside their para, neighbourhood) is not affected and men are seen as 
good guardians, doing all they can to look after their households. Indeed, many men considered it a 
point of honour that their wives did not directly use the loan themselves, maintaining the norm that 
important financial dealings are men’s responsibility. As a result, taking on loans via wives gave men 
the opportunity to retrieve a ‘moral status’ as provider and guardian of the household. This was 
important for men themselves but also for the household’s reputation in the immediate community as 
‘male guardianship’ is considered socially an indicator of ‘the order of things’ (Maitrot, 2017). Such 
stories of idols are therefore powerful idioms and symbols that legitimize and diffuse the idea of 
borrowing in order to improve livelihoods as socially acceptable and morally compelling.
Microfinance agents play an active role in constructing and instrumentalizing idols as symbols of 
success. The case of Joynuddin and Monowara illustrates this well. In 1989, shortly after Joynuddin 
had decided to quit his MFI (on his wife’s behalf) because – as he described it - his business was 
prosperous and he no longer needed it, another MFI visited him to recruit him as an idol. They had 
heard about him and wanted to convince him to take more loans. So, he agreed and borrowed 
BDT5,000 and then BDT10,000. He managed to repay the latter loan but with great difficulty. Once 
he had repaid, he again decided to quit. However in his view, microfinance agents did not want to let 
him go because he was still a ‘good client’ and the community looked up to him and considered him 
an example of success – someone who had met all his moral obligations. Holding on to the couple’s 
savings14, the microfinance agents told him that by quitting he would make it more difficult for them 
to recruit and retain clients15. As this case suggests, idols are critical narratives that legitimise and 
normalise microfinance activities.
14 In Bangladesh throughout the 1990s and 2000s, microfinance borrowers generally needed to make 
compulsory savings for a period between 40 and 60 weeks before being granted a loan. While the compulsory 
savings component was originally introduced to protect institutions against defaulting clients, many 
microfinance agents breached their operation manual by refusing to return savings to ‘good clients’ in an 
attempt to discourage them from leaving their MFI (Maitrot, 2019). 
15 After months long negotiation with the MFI, Joynuddin finally recovered the savings and quit the MFI. 
Joynuddin and Monowara’s success rested in their capacity to make astute judgements about opportunities and 
risks.
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The identification and reference to idols was effective in all four villages I studied, influencing 
villagers’ aspirations and behaviour. While the decision to participate in microfinance is often seen as 
indicative of ‘progressive’ character traits in clients (risk taking, entrepreneurialism, challenging 
social norms and so on), in the villages I studied a large part of the decision making process for 
individuals was driven by the imitation and following of examples set by peers (Khandker et al., 
1998: 108). Indeed, the majority of microfinance clients (or their husband/father/brother or other male 
guardian) perceived loans not as an opportunity to do something new or innovative, but to reproduce 
or imitate what an idol had previously done. These dynamics are not dissimilar to those identified by 
Kar and Schuster in India and Paraguay (2016). In the area where I conducted the fieldwork, it was 
for example common for most respondents’ husbands to indicate that they wanted to use loans to start 
a chicken or cow farm ‘like this man in Dhanbari [a nearby town]’. Or as one respondent, Kamal, put 
it, ‘I simply followed the others. Whatever they were doing I trusted them and I also did the same. If I 
saw someone taking loans and doing well, I also followed him to get the same successes’. These 
examples hence indicate how MFIs relied on narratives of idols to minimize the perception of risk 
associated with becoming an MFI borrower16 (Radhakrishnan, 2015; Weber et al., 2004). In so doing 
credit agents pursue their own interests and the interests of their organizations by presenting credit 
borrowing as following the example of morally good community members. 
Borrowing as caring
Normally, when a male household male member agrees to participate in microfinance, a woman in his 
household is required to consent and ‘give her name’17 so he can access loans. Most of the clients 
interviewed were married and had moved from their natal village (her baper bari or ‘father’s village’) 
to their husband’s (patri bari or husband’s village) as is local custom (Balasubramanian, 2013). In 
this process, they join a new network (Chowdhury, 2010; Rozario, 1992), assume a new identity as a 
notun bou (young bride) soon to become a mother (White, 2017). As discussed earlier, with marriage 
comes a set of obligations and care duties towards the new family. For women in the villages studied, 
a motivation for giving formal consent to MFIs was to perform to expectations and fulfil their moral 
obligations. This often took the form of safeguarding morality, improving their status within the 
household, and ensuring bad reputation (durnam) does not fall on the household.  
16 Some authors have argued that rather than comparing alternatives before making a choice, decision-makers 
often simply imitate the choices made by others Pingle, M. (1995) 'Imitation versus rationality: An experimental 
perspective on decision making', The Journal of Socio-Economics 24(2): 281-315. Imitation is often perceived 
as relatively less costly.
17 The phrase ‘give their name’ is used locally to refer to becoming signatory to a loan. This expression is often 
used by clients themselves, reflecting the commodification of women’s names in the process of accessing 
microfinance loans. As has been widely documented, although MFIs largely target women, men remain the 
primary loan users (Goetz and Gupta, 1996).
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For women, accessing loans is often considered a way of demonstrating love and respect to their 
guardians. The ‘order of things’ within households is implicitly defined by reciprocity through which 
individuals prove the legitimacy of their membership. Within large extended households for example, 
the legitimacy of a couple (son and daughter-in-law plus dependents) within the family unit is often at 
risk if those are perceived to be insufficiently contributing to the economic life of the household. Like 
many women I met, Naseema said she had taken MFI loans ‘out of love for my family, because my 
husband requested I do so [my emphasis added] it’. A particularly common motivation for taking 
loans was the health, medical needs and wellbeing of elderly shashur and shashuri (father and 
mother-in law, respectively). In this context, fulfilling and performing a ‘moral duty’ by adhering to 
patriarchal norms and agreeing to take on loans, is imperative for women seeking to maintain good 
relationships within the household and preserve or improve their access to security through male 
guardianship. As a result, failing to meet expectations (or failing to demonstrate a willingness to meet 
them) is often interpreted as a transgression of social norms and risking the withdrawal of male 
guardianship. 
Over time microfinance has also become a means through which women compete and demonstrate 
their deservedness of guardianship. The fact that other young bou borrow, creates an environment 
where comparisons are drawn across households, and of course microfinance borrowing becomes a 
socially accepted practice and a norm. Female respondents often explained that they felt pressured to 
take loans, and that taking loans was a new means of fulfilling social expectations, that includes their 
expectations of themselves. The extent to which microfinance participation has become a norm has 
increased as the market has become saturated, putting pressure on credit agents to recruit and retain 
clients (Maîtrot, 2019). Between five and eight MFIs were operating in each of the villages studied 
because the appetite for microfinance is high and competitive. This is not uncommon in Bangladesh, 
with the poor often having better access to microfinance than basic state services (Rutherford, 2009). 
Credit agents are therefore in fierce competition and seek advantage by reminding borrowers of their 
‘duty’ to their households, and how refusing to participate will harm their personal reputation in and 
outside of the household. If this approach fails, then credit agents will approach husbands or male 
guardians and remind them that their wives may be falling short in their duties. With two-thirds of the 
entire populations of the villages actively borrowing or having borrowed from microfinance 
organizations, the decision to borrow therefore represents a means to adhere to local norms. 
The effects of this approach can be strongly felt at the household level. For example, daughters-in-law 
commonly display and express love by sacrificing their wellbeing for that of their guardian(s) and 
children, and clients reported that by refusing to participate, their guardian would compare them 
unfavourably vis-a-vis other bou in the vicinity or daughters-in-law in the households who did agree 
to take or top-up loans. We thus see a competition between female members of the households, 
Page 15 of 28 Development and Change
16
anxious not to be seen as ‘less caring’. Credit agents and husbands reinforce these expectations. Some 
women reported that when credit agents heard of their reluctance to ‘give their name’ for their 
husband to access loans, agents would ‘convince’ them, either directly or using husbands as 
intermediaries, by emphasizing their duty of care towards their family and their moral duty to support 
their husband. 
In the case of elderly widows, this power configuration might differ. In poor households, after the 
death of the father, the mother will often become dependent on the guardianship of her son(s). If the 
parents were living independently from the son’s household, the mother will often try to recover her 
son’s guardianship because he would traditionally have a moral duty to care for her. In this setting, 
daughters-in-laws can refuse to ‘give their name’ for a loan and encourage their husbands to ‘request’ 
their mothers to borrow for them. Since microfinance debts are often written-off after the death of the 
client, asking an elderly woman to take out a loan could point to a pragmatic shift of caring 
responsibility on the part of the daughter-in-law. Loans offer an infrastructure for sustaining or re-
gaining male guardianship, which ultimately reproduces, and shapes gendered norms, institutions and 
hierarchies, including sometimes by shifting responsibilities for care. In any case, women understand 
that by refusing to access loans they put themselves at risk of being denied guardianship and 
protection.
Although traditionally, making major financial decisions is not considered a ‘female’ responsibility or 
obligation (Kabeer, 1999), women’s borrowing is at times also motivated by an aspiration to lead or 
support the pursuit of small business ventures. Married women often do not want to be seen as 
managing their own financial affairs as that is considered a husband’s duty. Often, they described that 
performing humility and risk aversion constituted important features of the ‘good wife’. Yet, this did 
not mean that some harboured aspirations to pursue or support economic ventures. Women reported 
that they too could contribute financially to the fortune and wellbeing of their households. Loans were 
therefore used by women to purchase land, rickshaws, and livestock or rent and work land (borga, 
sharecropping). In practice however – and as has been widely documented – loan use is often diverted 
towards so-called ‘non-productive’ purposes, or ‘consumption loans’ such as medical costs, 
emergency home repairs, wedding costs and dowry (Ahmed et al., 2001; Goetz and Gupta, 1996; 
Kabeer, 2001; Roodman and Morduch, 2014). These uses of loans are often contentiously presented 
by researchers as ‘irrational’ (Carvalho et al., 2016), but also by other villagers as ‘bad choices’. 
Presenting these choices as such because they do not strictly conform to the idea of what being an 
entrepreneur means, however de-politicize the context within which poor women make ‘choices’ and 
ignore the moral trade-offs they often face. Many female respondents explained ‘not being able to use 
the loan properly’ because they have to take care of their children, husband and in-laws. It is for them 
a moral and pragmatic pursuit of the duty to care. Women expressed feeling caught between two 
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competing expectations: on the one hand, they are expected to repay their loans (and avoid public 
shame) and on the other hand, they are pressured to use the repayment money (or the entire loan) to 
fulfil their ‘duty of care’ towards their families.18 
MORALITY AND DEVELOPMENT
Globally, the expansion of microfinance in development has been built on a discourse of female 
empowerment and poverty reduction. However, this article has shown how microfinance’s expansion 
in practice has relied much more on local discourses, crafted by credit agents, in which borrowing, 
paradoxically, conforms to existing patriarchal and hierarchical social institutions, ultimately 
neutralising ideas of social change. Actors ‘for whom development constitutes a resource, a 
profession, a market, a stake or a strategy’ (Bierschenk et al., 2000; De Sardan, 2005: 11) embed the 
idea of transformation and empowerment within existing moral frameworks and power structures. A 
prominent tool to achieve this is the use of narratives around idols as powerful symbols of modernity 
and morality. In rural Bangladesh this discourse creates aspirations and expectations for individuals to 
become successful and acquire greater moral status. For poor women, taking on loans plays an 
important part in legitimizing their membership in the household and helps them make claims around 
protection and guardianship. Morality is a compelling motivation for both men and women who 
yearning for security, attempt to imitate successful idols, and makes microfinance participation a 
rational choice. However, this plays out differently for men and women. As a result, microfinance 
borrowing, often branded as a harbinger of values such as self-determination, agency and 
entrepreneurship, ends up reinforcing existing norms and hierarchies. 
The discourse around microfinance is agency-laden but often ignores the contexts in which people 
‘make choices’ – a context shaped by the customs and values favoured by the majority (Bouman, 
1989) and inter-personal obligations (Gudeman, 2001). The findings highlighted in the article raise 
important questions about the constitutive role of morality for agency and for relationships. It is 
precisely because networks and ties of mutual and relational obligations shape individuals’ identity, 
choices and roles (De Sardan, 1999; Granovetter, 1985), that they protect existing social institutions 
and ‘trap’ individuals (Malamoud, 1980: 14). This may trigger a ‘Faustian Bargain’ (Wood, 2003) 
whereby many poor women, exposed to pervasive uncertainties and in need of security, have to 
perform and meet expectations in line with dharma, in order to be considered deserving of male 
18 Outside of the decision making processes behind loan uptake, it should also be noted that the 
burden and obligation felt for repayment falls disproportionately on women. This has been widely 
documented in the literature (Garikipati et al. 2017, Hussain 2010, Kabeer 2017), and was also the 
case here where women described a complex range of malpractices (Karim 2011, Maitrot 2018, 
2019, Paprocki, 2016).
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guardianship. In this context, I find women’s agency to be shaped by complex inter-personal gendered 
hierarchies and webs of inter-dependencies. These social relations influence the terms on which 
women perceive themselves and their actions. Their perception of who they are, or want to be, is tied 
to how they behave towards others. This invites us to consider agency in relational term, always 
embedded within and shaped by a process of social relationships. As Burkitt (2015: 332) suggests 
understanding agency as such acknowledges the ‘transactional’ dimension(s) in people’s action. 
Further, this article shows agency is both constrained and constituted by the performance of morality, 
which is related to disposition to risk and expectations of loyalty, two notions that bear specific 
gendered meanings. Relations of kinship and male patronage structure ‘the order of things’ for 
women and constitute the main means of wealth redistribution (Devine and White, 2013; Lewis, 
2017; Van Schendel, 2009). The choice to borrow is not a proposition to challenge established norms 
and values but rather an exercise of social imitation and moral conformity necessary to secure 
guardianship. Making a choice, as Kabeer has argued (1999: 497), implies being able to choose from 
a number of limited viable alternatives. In contexts of poverty, exclusion and patriarchy, the option of 
viable alternatives cannot be presumed. Expectations around morality or the ‘right order of things’, 
mediates choice and as this article has argued, can increase women’s responsibilities without 
necessarily transforming the norms or values that discriminate against them. The analysis thus calls 
for greater attention to be given to the significance of moral economies as sites that enforce social 
imitation and moral compliance. It also reinforces the idea that current development ideals around 
individual agency and empowerment can only be enacted incrementally and if ‘morally’ legitimized 
at local levels. This challenges thus key assumptions about the relationship between development and 
social change. 
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ANNONYMOUS RESPONSE TO REVIEWER’S COMMENTS
Reviewer 1: 
The argument often takes a historical/diachronic angle, relying on oral history of the 
early days of microfinance in the 1970s/80s. However, the analysis tends to be quite 
synchronic, and does not attempt to explain the shifts that appear in the data (e.g. 
microfinance from immoral/treated with suspicion to performing 'guardian role' for 
men, this is all on page 10). The author covers this ground so quickly that the shift from 
guardian/keeping loans out to guardian/accept loans as a market of success and 
aspiration is not terribly clear. That agents attempt to normalise microloans comes 
through the story, but how and with what effects to the existing moral frameworks of 
guardianship (how normative ideals of senior masculinity have changed, for example) 
would be usefully discussed with more clarity.
I would like to thank the reviewer for this comment. While I agree that it be interesting to 
produce a more balanced gender analysis on the interactions of microfinance with local moral 
frameworks, it is beyond the scope of this article to cover this extensively. I am working on a 
project that aims to analyse how development interventions impact ideas about masculinity. 
The section mentioned by the reviewer has now been amended slightly to acknowledge how 
the strategies developed by the MFI agents accompanied the commercialisation and 
widespread of the practice of microfinance.
A further analytic question that may be outside the scope of this paper but which might 
be useful to pursue in other analysis would be a discussion of jealousy around *idols.* 
The success of some village members is portrayed as unequivocally a source of hope and 
aspiration. However, work by scholars such as Julia Elyachar suggest that individual 
success can bring ambivalence and even fears of evil eye. This might be addressed in the 
context of the 'inspiration' proffered by idols.
This is a really important point. I am interested in understanding how conflictual the process 
of improving one’s living standards can be. In particular, some of the data collected suggests 
that some of the strategies deployed to manage livelihood improvements while eschewing 
jealousy and envy are often be gendered.  This topic deserves robust empirical analysis of the 
anthropology of consumption, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this paper. 
A final empirical question is about repayment. The essay offers an excellent and 
thorough analysis of the moral frameworks that incite people to borrow. Much less is 
said about repayment - the gendered expectations around shame of default, struggles to 
pay, asking for help, calling on kin-based interdependencies, &c. Perhaps this might be 
a topic to address in the essay’s conclusion.
This is clearly important, yet largely beyond the scope of this paper. I have incorporated 
footnote 19 to make reference to this.  
Reviewer 3:
It would be possible to draw together all the elements in the title, but it would take a 
great deal of skill to do so. Agency also weaves in and out, not always in a consistent 
way, and seems to emerge as a primary concern at the end.
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It is good to see more of the work on gender in Bangladesh. It still, however, feels a little 
uneven. The constructions of purdah, and of dharma, for example, do not seem to me to 
be understood in a consistent way. The literature review does not set up clear questions 
to be explored. Overall, there are some interesting observations, but the theorization 
needs to be considerably more developed. 
1st sentence: meaning of ‘idols’ needs to be given a context. Who calls them this (and 
what else might they be called by others!).
This has been clarified in footnote 9.
The writing needs some attention, it is rather imprecise. E.g. P2 ‘combat over-zealous 
structuralist ideas about poverty’ – not clear whose ideas, what ‘overzealous’ might 
mean, etc. 
P3 ‘the poor’ being coerced by ‘husbands’. The loose style is irritating (at least to this!) 
reader.
The sections referred to above have been edited and clarified. 
P2 My memory is that microfinance was first promoted as a way to give poor people 
(especially women) access to loans as the funds they required were too small for banks 
to be bothered with….?
The earliest microfinance model used the group lending methodology to reduce some of the 
management costs and financial risks of lending money to poor women who had great 
financial needs and limited earning and credit history. 
P3 Problematic to suggest critiques without giving detail and then assuming they are 
‘valid’
The sentence on page 3 refers to critiques and concerns mentioned in the previous sentence. 
If that wasn’t clear the sentences have now been edited in ways that hopefully clarify this 
link. 
P3 Strange to claim opening story indicates microfinance as moral imperative, when the 
story itself makes no mention of morality.
P3 is microfinance a moral compass? The argument is not that microfinance is a moral 
compass but that its discourse is locally constructed as such, in order to gain interest and 
make it appealing to all. 
P3 ‘a means to sustain, redeem or compete for male guardianship’ – needs some 
explanation, as it suggests such a counter-intuitive combination of worlds, using market 
language in relation to guardianship.
I feel these dynamics are sufficiently explained in the body of the text and empirical sections 
and do not feel that using ‘market language’ here is at odds with the pursuit of economic 
security by the poor.
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P3 introduction of ‘individual agency in relation to social change and development’ 
widens the scope in a way that is perhaps over ambitious.
The sentence has been slightly edited to ‘thereby rethinking the place of individual agency in 
relation to social change in development’ making it slightly more narrow and less ambitious. 
P4 I am not sure what claim of connection is being made by ‘coalesced historically’ with 
Rankin’s work, but it does not seem to me an entirely convincing fit.
I strongly feel that discourses drawing on powerful ‘gender ideologies’ and ‘rational choice 
theory’ co-evolved in the development sector and influenced the development of 
microfinance and reinforced its attractiveness to the international community. 
P5 – isn’t it ok to be a subject of development, so long as you are not subject to it? This 
paragraph seems to me a little undigested.
I have not addressed this point as such discussions are beyond the scope of this article. 
P6 are ‘the poor’ properly referred to as ‘one particular actor’? This doesn’t sound like 
a very relational approach to me!
The sentence has been edited. 
P9 not sure how much ‘confidentiality’ would be possible in such contexts. Something 
on informed consent procedures should be included in methodology.
Issue of positionality and confidentiality have been expanded on. 
P9 ‘idols’ is such an interesting term in the context of predominantly Muslim rural BD. 
So much more could be made of this!
I would like to thank the reviewer for this comment. The relevant paragraph has been 
expanded on page 10-11 to elaborate on the interpretation of the term ‘idol’ in this context. 
There also needs to be more discussion of ‘guardian’.
I agree with the reviewer’s comment, but unfortunately this isn’t possible due to the limited 
word count.
P10 Did microfinance officers enter homesteads?
The following sentence included in the manuscript addresses this question: ‘Male household 
members, conforming to their guardian role, act as gatekeepers and are generally distrustful 
towards unfamiliar men entering their homestead.’
P11 I think we need some evidence of the moral (Islamic) resistance to microfinance. 
For example, I don’t think people in general realised how high the interest rate was, as 
it was paid back in weekly instalments.
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The point made by the reviewer here is unclear as taking any form of interest on a loan is 
forbidden in Islam. The rate of interest taken is irrelevant when such considerations are taken 
in account. 
P11 needs to be clear what is the basis of the information about calculations made by 
MFI workers
The following paragraph was added to address the reviewer’s comment and clarify some of 
the key elements influencing MFI agents’ calculations and strategies:
Microfinance agents make a rapid informal judgement about sources of potential tensions 
between their aim to formalise loans and a household’s view of the ‘proper order of things’. 
This judgement takes the level of vulnerability and poverty of a household into account 
judging by the size and condition of the homestead, the quality of clothes worn by the 
household members, and number of assets populating their homestead. Another element 
affecting the agents’ judgement is the religiosity of the household members. This requires 
recognizing contextual religious and cultural codes, ‘the material and ideological resources 
and practices of households and families’ (Standing, 1991:12). As well as reading into 
people’s verbal and body communication, agents can observe the degree to which purdah is 
enforced, religious clothing can be used as part of a wider set of symbols to signal piousness 
and religiosity (hijab or veil, tupi, Islamic beard and so on). From this information, agents 
infer the nature of kinship and interpersonal relationships and gender hierarchies 
characterising the household.
P12 idols and being rich. Not clear how this is about a moral economy, which is 
typically about keeping things even in some way. In general, claims about moral content 
of arguments need to be better substantiated.
The substantiation of the dynamics analysed in the paper, I think, is sufficient to substantiate 
the claims made about the gendered meanings of morality and economic behaviour.
P 14 I have no doubt that in some households taking a loan is seen as women’s duty, but 
is it so in all? Again, it would be good to know the depth of this data – based on one 
example or many? Counter examples?
Because loans have by and large been made available to women only, the position of women 
as entry points for others to get access to loans is extremely common (and normalised). 
P15 Ds in law asking that their mothers in law should take loans rather than themselves 
is interesting. Again, would be good to know more about this.
The comment above is not clear. I could not address it. 
P16 ‘borga’ needs to be translated as sharecropping.
This has been clarified.
P16 nice point re duty of care. Reference to ‘irrationality’ though seems to me a bit of a 
deviation.
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Two of the three references to ‘irrationality’ have been delete in order to address this 
comment. 
P16 ‘idols’ not a traditional moral framework – the knitting together of different 
fragments of ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ discourse needs to be much more critically 
examined
I would like to thank the reviewer for this suggestion – and hope the additional edits 
reflecting on ‘idol’ addresses it sufficiently. I agree that more could be said about the 
formation of the idol discourse, yet it is beyond the scope of this paper to discussion 
‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ ideas and values. 
P17 the notion of ‘relational agency’ might prove helpful.
This suggestion was very useful. Although I cannot develop it fully here I have edited the 
middle paragraph in the conclusion, which I think helps better capture the analytical point 
about the inter-personal construction of agency. I would like to thank the reviewer for this 
comment! 
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